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BENJAMIN S. HAYES*
Moral rights are "'personality" rights which have long been part of the
copyright law regimes of many European and otherjurisdictions, however these
rights have only recently begun to be integrated into US. law. With the
acceleration of global legal harmonization of copyright laws, most notably
including the Berne convention, the issue of how and to what extent moral rights
should be integrated into US. law has become more pressing. A number of
areas of conflict between moral rights and US. copyright law exist, including
aspects of the US. work for hire doctrine. This Paper gives a brief history of
moral rights and their application in the United States. The author argues that
some moral rights, chiefly the rights of attribution and the droit de suite, are
economic rather than '"personality" rights. The author concludes by making the
argument that the U.S. work for hire doctrine should be modified to
accommodate the integration, at least in a limited sense, of those moral rights
which may properly be viewed as economic rights.
I. INTRODUCTION
The accession to the Berne Convention and the passage of the Visual Rights
Artists Act' ("VARA") have begun to force an issue which has been nagging at
the United States for some time: How to cope with moral rights. Moral rights
have long been part of the law of other nations, nations with which the United
States does a substantial amount of trade. In addition, the Internet has, because of
its ubiquity without regard for geography, created urgent need for international
harmonization of copyright laws. As such, the constraints of doing business in
multiple legal systems has forced the hand of the U.S. Congress in order to
facilitate trade.
This Paper argues that the full integration of at least some moral rights into
American copyright law is supportable for two principal reasons: First, a uniform
international copyright scheme is desirable, and second, that moral rights can be
reasonably viewed as economic rather than 'natural" or personality rights. This
latter proposition is somewhat unorthodox and controversial. This Paper does not
dispute that moral rights originated as personality rights, distinct from economic
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rights. However, the analysis below of the application of various moral rights to
the work for hire doctrine takes notice of the fact that regardless of their original
purpose (protecting noneconomic rights) the application of moral rights can have
substantial economic consequences and therefore these rights can be properly
viewed as economic rights. Although this interpretation of moral rights
represents a shift in the way these rights are considered, such a change is
gradually gaining support.2
When calls go up from the United States for harmonization of international
intellectual property law they often call to have the rest of the world harmonize
with the United States, and to do away with moral rights. This would be an
undesirable result for both economic and noneconomic reasons.
Much of the tension between moral rights and American copyright law may
derive from the work for hire doctrine, which is squarely at odds with certain
moral rights. This Paper analyzes the extent to which the work for hire doctrine
conflicts with each of the rights falling under the general rubric of "moral rights."
The argument then concludes that the United States should modify the work for
hire doctrine in order to accommodate at least the moral right of attribution,
thereby empowering authors and allowing them to more fully capitalize on their
ingenuity and creativity. While there are numerous issues raised by any attempt
to square moral rights with American copyright law, the scope of this Paper will
be limited to how moral rights interact with the work for hire doctrine,
individually and collectively.
II. MORAL RIGHTS
A. The History ofMoral Rights in the United States
There is no tradition of moral rights in the United States.4 Intellectual
property rights derive from the U.S. Constitution,5 and as such are statutorily-
created rights. Moral rights are a creation of civil law, and are generally viewed
as "natural" rights.6 Not only have moral rights not played a part of American
2 See, ag., Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use,
54 WASH. & LEEL. REV.33, 63-68 (1997).
3 The crux of the work for hire doctrine, explained in more detail infra Part lIlA., is that
when one is hired to create a work, the work is legally authored by the employer. Thus, the
moral rights of attribution, integrity, and the droit de suite, all conflict with the basic idea of a
work for hire by vesting in authors ongoing and inalienable rights.
4 See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14,24 (2d Cir. 1976).
5 U. S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, ci. 8.
6 See generally Ciolino, supra note 2, at 43 (classifying moral rights as "noneconomie");
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL PROP. L. REV. 1,
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law, but they have been viewed in the United States, at least by the U.S.
Congress, with little affection.
It is no surprise then that the United States should encounter difficulty when
trying to incorporate moral rights into U.S. law;, it is difficult, conceptually and
practically, to attach natural rights as an add-on to statutory rights. Indeed, this
problem is exemplary of the basic conflict between natural law and statutorily-
based law;, viewing law as having its basis in a document is a fundamentally
different paradigm than viewing law as existing in an intangible and existential
form.7
In order to successfully attach moral rights to American law it would be
necessary to effectuate significant change in the findamental goals and
philosophy of the federal copyright law. Questions are thus begged: Is this a
desirable goal, and if so, why? If there is truly a need for a harmonized
international copyright scheme, the answer to the first question should be yes.
Given the ease with which intellectual property can cross political borders in the
"information age," a harmonized international law of copyright is desirable.
Business can be done more efficiently when there exist predictable and
regularized legal consequences for a given action. One appropriate role of
government is to facilitate efficient economic systems. Thus, it follows that an
appropriate aim of government should be to pursue international harmonization
of copyright law.
Regardless of one's views on the desirability of internationalization, the fact
is that data technology has made it a reality, for good or ill. The Internet is an
environment where copyrighted works exist in every jurisdiction with a web
connection.8 Thus, the question of whether the internationalization of law is
1 (1997) [hereinaft How Art Fares]; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and Moral Right:
Is an American Mariage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1985) [hereinafter An American
Marriage]; Deborah Ross, Comment, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New
Obligationsfor Authors'Moral Rights?, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363,364 (1990) (berating Congress
for failing to appreciate the distinction between economic and moral rights).
7 The very concept of natural law, which assumes the existence of some objective truths,
can be difficult for Americans, accustomed to referring all law back to a tangible source, i.e. the
U.S. Constitution.
8 The Ninth Circuit has held that "copying," for the purposes of copyright infringement
analysis, occurs when a computer program is transferred from a permanent storage device to a
computer's random access memory. See Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d
511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994). Thus, any time a computer
user accesses a copyrighted work on a personal computer in the US., U.S. copyright law is
implicated. However, this result may not be the same in every jurisdiction around the world. If
a given act constitutes copyright infringement in one country, but it does not in another,
obvious problems in defending the rights of authors whose works are on the Internet arise. This
example illustrates the point that the Internet forces global considerations in regard to copyright
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desirable or not is already moot. To the extent that disharmony among the
copyright laws of different nations may produce inconsistent results for authors
trying to enforce their rights, such legal disharmony serves merely as an
impediment to the free flow of data-an essential component of market
efficiency in an information economy.
Other nations recognized this long ago, and pragmatically responded with
the Berne Convention.9 Although in its first incarnation the Berne Convention
was principally concerned with the high-minded ideal of preserving fine art
(analogous, perhaps, to the Endangered Species Act today), it evolved into a very
successful piece of international legislation, and currently enjoys wide legislative
support from most of the world.10 Yet the Berne Convention has received only
law.
9 The Berne Convention was first enacted by several European states in 1896, 56 years
before these states were able to achieve meaningful uniformity in other political contexts (i.e.
the Treaty of Rome). See Diego A. Ramos, "Oh, Pretty Woman," Luke Took Your Beauty
Away, May NAFTA Come to Your Rescue? Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Can There Ever Be
"Moral Rights" in the United States or Puerto Rico?, 29 REvisTA JURIDICA DE LA
UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE PuERTO RICO [INTERAMRCAN UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO
Rico LAW REVIEW] 173, 174 (1995). Given the wide divisions between European states at the
time of enactment, the Berne Convention can be viewed as an outgrowth of Western Culture:
One of the few things that Europeans could agree on in the 19th century was a respect for fine
art
10 As of March 20,2000, the following 143 states were party to this Convention: Albania,
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Barbuda, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire,
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji,
Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal (including Macau),
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland,
Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United
States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe. See World
Intellectual Property Organization, Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (last modified Mar. 20, 2000), <httpl/www.wipo. org/eng/ratific/e-bemeitrn>.
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grudging support from the world's leading purveyor of intellectual property, the
United States.
Congress has consistently resisted calls for greater moral right protection.
The United States steadfastly refused, for almost 100 years, to adopt the Berne
Convention, largely because of Congressional dislike of moral rights.11 The issue
of moral rights was neatly sidestepped when protests to Congress against
colorization of classic films by a cadre of directors and producers resulted in
passage of the National Film Preservation Act ('NFPA") of 1992.12 The NFPA
gives no moral right protection-essentially what was being sought 3-but
simply provides for archiving black and white film prints. Thus, Congress
managed to appease the artists without really affecting the copyright laws.14 The
NFPA is indicative of the general animus toward moral rights traditionally
expressed by Congress.
The most significant advance in the development of moral rights in
American federal law was the passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act.15 VARA
gives authors of visual works the right to enjoin alteration of the works where it
will adversely affect the artists' reputation,16 a highly subjective determination.
Although the United States formally acceded to the Berne Convention two years
prior to the passage of VARA, the passage of VARA was arguably a more
concrete step toward accepting moral rights, because of the limitations placed on
the Berne Convention. 17 Yet because passage of the Berne Convention was
strongly opposed by the entertainment and publishing induslries,18 its passage
could rightly be viewed as an important psychological hurdle in Congress's
acceptance of moral rights.19 However, U.S. courts will not look to the Berne
I ISee Henry Hansmnn & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 L LEGAL STUD. 95,96-97 (1997).
12 See2 U.S.C. § 179 (1992).
13 Specifically the right of integrity. Descriptions of this and the other traditional moral
rights are found infra Part II.E.1.
14 See 2U.S.C. § 179.
15 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (1990) (codified in scattered
sections c€ 17 U.S.C.).
16 See Kwall, How Art Fares, supra note 6, at 2.
17 See S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706,3714-15.
18 See id. at 3708.
19 See H.1. REP. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6925,
stating:
An artist's professional and personal identity is embodied in each work created by that
artist Each work is a part of his or her reputation. Each work is a form of personal
expression (oftentimes painstakingly and earnestly recorded). It is a rebuke to the dignity
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Convention as controlling law because the Implementation Act explicitly
provides that the treaty is not self-executing.20 Therefore, there is no private right
to action directly under Beme.21
Courts construe international treaties as being in harmony with the U.S.
Constitution. To the extent that moral rights might be seen to conflict with the
constitutional grant of intellectual property rights, it seems likely that the moral
right provisions of the Berne Convention will be given limited or no effect Thus
the passage of VARA is, as a practical matter, more significant in actually
bringing moral rights to American law.
Although Congress has manifested precious little interest in developing
moral rights further,22 the states have proceeded with the passage of various
moral right provisions.23 How the courts will view state moral right provisions in
light of federal preemption remains to be seen. It is noteworthy that while
Congress remains so unwilling to explore moral right expansion there seems to
be a groundswell of support from the states. But despite this expression of
popular support for moral rights, state legislation is vulnerable to preemption in
such a solidly federal area as intellectual property.
B. What Are "Moral Rights?"
Before continuing this analysis it is important to review the rights in
question. In a sense, it is misleading to refer generally to 'noral rights" because
the term is used to refer to a group of concepts whose constituent parts often
depend on who is making the reference.24
of the visual artist that our copyright law allows distortion, modification and even outright
permanent destruction of such efforts.
Id
20 See Patrick G. Zabatta, Note, Moral Rights and Musical Works: Are Composers
GettingBerned?, 43 SYRACuSEL. REv. 1095, 1098 (1992).
21 See id
22 See id (noting that the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 explicitly states
that "no expansion ofmoral rights was intended by United States accession to the trea.").
2 3 See, e.g., Kwall, How Art Fares, supra note 6, at 30-31 nn.166-72 and accompanying
text.
24 Compare Kwall, An American Marriage, supra note 6, at 5 (describing moral right as
consisting of the rights of disclosure, paternity, and integrity) with Hansmann & Santilli, supra
note 10, at 95-96 (stating that moral right generally is thought to have four components: the
rights of integrity, attribution, disclosure, and withdrawal) and with Ramos, supra note 9, at
174-75 (stating that moral rights generally include the right of integrity, withdrawal,
attribution, disclosure, the right to preclude others from claiming authorship, and the droit de
suite).
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The United States is not alone in its reluctance to adopt what it views as
foreign law; moral rights are not harmonized among European Union member
states either, despite European Union harmonization of a wide variety of
legislation. Various levels of protection are enjoyed by artists in different
European States.25 While all European Union members are Berne signatories,
the European Commission has avoided attempting to harmonize moral rights
across Europe. The 1993 directive harmonizing the term of copyright explicitly
exempts moral rights.2 6 The directive on protection of databases recognizes
moral right as falling outside its scope. Recently the European Parliament
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights recommended a directive
harmonizing moral rights.27
In the interests of clarity, this Paper will use the term "moral rights" to
include the rights of: attribution, integrity, disclosure, withdrawal, and droit de
suite. Where appropriate, specific rights will be analyzed by name so as to avoid
confusion.
The right of attribution is essentially the right to be credited as an author of a
work. The right of attribution directly conflicts with the U.S. work for hire
doctrine, which credits the employer or commissioner of a work with its
authorship. A corollary, the right of "negative attribution," is the right to not have
one's name attributed to a work which one did not create.28 The right of negative
attribution is generally part and parcel of the right of attribution, and is included
in the limited right of attribution created by VARA.29
The right of integrity is the legal right to object to the alteration or
destruction of a work.30 This right is similar to the right to prepare derivative
works, under U.S. law, in that the author maintains a continuing right to prevent
alteration after he has sold the work. 31 However, prior to U.S. accession to the
25 France, for example, has an absolute right to enjoin the destruction of an artistic work,
see Kwall, An American Mariage, supra note 6, at 12 n.45, while Switzerland simply requires
that an owner who wishes to destroy a piece of art must first offer to sell it to the artist for the
cost of the materials which went into it. See Swiss Federal Act on Copyright and Neighboring
Rights of 1992 (RS 231.1) § 15; Marina Santilli, United States'Moral Rights Developments in
European Perspective, 1 MARQ. INTELL PROP. L. REV. 89,100 (1997).
26 See Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October, 1993, preamble, para. 21
(harmonizing the term ofprotection of copyright and certain related rights).
27 See Resolution on the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens Rights, EuR. PARE.
Doc. (COM (96) 056--C4-0090/97), 15,39 (1997).
28 See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 11, at 130.
2 9 See id; 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990).
30 See, e.g., Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 11, at 99-100.
31 An important disctinction should be noted, however Sale of a particular work is not
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Berne Convention and the passage of VARA there was nothing in U.S. law that
prevented a purchaser of a work from destroying it.3 2 The Berne Convention
provides that an author shall have the right "to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of... the work, which would be prejudicial to
his honor or reputation. '33
Although case law pertaining to VARA is still scarce, it seems that
American courts are instinctively hostile to the right of integrity,34 and have
relied on the work for hire doctrine to avoid granting it.35 Common law courts
have always been loathe to infer servitudes, and the right of integrity is basically
a form of equitable servitude. As a related matter, courts have also traditionally
rejected constraints on the free alienability of property. The two principles are
conceptually related; Anglo-American jurisprudence believes in the proposition
that property should change hands without any kind of ongoing encumbrance.
Thus, the right of integrity may well meet strong resistance from the courts on
the theory that it is inconsistent with the free alienability of property.
The right of disclosure is the right to withhold a work until the creator feels it
is complete.3 6 In a sense, this right is not dissimilar to the right of integrity; the
right to have a work kept free from distortion is essentially a right to determine
the final shape of the work. The right of disclosure can thus be viewed as a
subspecies of the right of integrity.
An argument could also be advanced that the right of disclosure is not
dissimilar to the First Amendment right of expression; the freedom to express
the equivalent to sale of the underlying copyright in the work. An author who has sold the
copyright along with the work does not have a continuing right to enjoin the preparation of
derivative works. Only authors who have sold their works while retaining the copyrights may
do so. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
32 See, e.g., Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that while the
moral right of integrity is actionable in Europe, it is not under the U.S. Copyright Act).
33 Id; see also Paris Act of the Beme Convention, Article 6bis.
3 4 See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997) (disapproving the
notion that an author's right to control preparation of derivative works is equivalent to a right of
integrity); Weinstein v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) (refising to
acknowledge a right of integrity while acknowledging that an author's sole right to prepare
derivative works is analogous); United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14231, *51 (D. D.C., Sept 14, 1998) (declining to even consider the application of the
right of integrity outside the context of visual works).
3 5 See, e.g., Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 1995) (dodging the
issue of whether an installation was protected by the right of integrity under VARA by finding
that the work was one for hire and thus exempt from VARA). But see Martin v. City of
Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 609 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court's damage award under
VARA after defendant city destroyed plaintiff's sculpture).
3 6 See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 11, at 96.
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oneself necessarily includes the freedom to decide when one isfinished doing so.
However, while constitutional arguments perhaps could be made that the right of
disclosure already exists as a penumbral right, these arguments have not been
made and nothing in American law grants an explicit right of disclosure. Again,
this right is in conflict with the work for hire doctrine; an employer or
commissioner of a work legally has the final say over when a work is complete.
The right of withdrawal is the right of an artist to recall a work if he decides
it is no longer consistent with his artistic vision.3 7 This right is limited to
published, rather than visual works, and its exercise requires indemnification to
the property holder for damages. 38 Similar to the right of integrity, this right
amounts to an equitable servitude on property, and as such it would surely be
difficult for U.S. courts to accept. In the unlikely event that Congress were to
muster support for a right of withdrawal, the courts would undoubtedly limit it
immediately. Even among jurisdictions where other moral rights have long been
accepted, the right of withdrawal has been slow to find enthusiasm, although
there is speculation that the European Union may be moving toward an European
Union-wide right of withdrawal.39
There are also obvious practical problems with the right of withdrawal, such
as the difficulty in establishing an affirmative showing of harm to the author-a
prerequisite to an exercise of the right.4° Furthermore, given that an author will
be liable for indemnification, it would almost always make better economic
sense for the author to save the costs of litigation and simply repurchase the
work.4 1 Given what will often be a high cost of indemnification or repurchase
and a wide difference in bargaining strength between authors and publishers, as a
practical matter a right of withdrawal may not be of any use to authors.
Droit de suite42 is an inalienable right to an interest in the resale profits of
certain works.43 Although this right is sometimes lumped in with moral rights, it
is more clearly an economic right than any of the others. As noted, Anglo-
American property law has a strong tradition of the free alienability of property,
as well as the freedom to contract, both of which conflict with the droit de suite.
Property cannot be said to be freely alienable when a person who is not a party to
the sale has a right to a cut of the proceeds; the droit de suite is an economic
encumbrance. The freedom to contract is similarly impinged because, again,
37 See it
38 See id at 139.
39 See id. at 140n.119.
40 See id.
4 1 See id at 140-41.
42 This means literally, "right of continuation." See Ramos, supra note 9, at 175.
43 See i d
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remuneration to the author is made an automatic "term" of any contract for the
resale of a piece of art. Yet the droite de suite could be of great importance to
authors, particularly those who sell their works in obscurity for many years
before gaining notoriety. The droite de suite could allow these authors either to
fetch higher prices for their works in the first place by assigning the right, or to
cash in on the benefits of their own success when early works are later resold at
many times the original selling price.44
The droit de suite is unlikely to find a place in American law, however,
because it directly conflicts with the "first sale" doctrine,45 a well-settled feature
of the Copyright Act. The first sale doctrine can be summarized simply as the
principle that after an author sells her work, she has no further right to receive
reward from its resale-in other words, the exact opposite of the droite de suite.
Despite the institutionalized hostility in the United States to the droit de suite, it
remains a significant potential tool for authors to enhance their bargaining
position, and should, therefore, be regarded as an economic right during
consideration of future legal harmonizations.
C. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention was drafted in 1891, revised in 1971, and is now
acceded to by more than 90 countries&46 The Convention is administered by the
World Intellectual Property Organization. 7 The moral right provision of Berne
is article 6bis, which affords authors limited rights of attribution and integrity.48
The Convention, as stated, was explicitly made non-self-executing by the
Berne Convention Implementation Act in the United States. The United States is
44 The droite de suite has a certain moral appeal in this regard. Take, for instance, the case
of American singer/songwriter Billy Joel, who, while still inexperienced, sold the rights to
many of his early hits and thus reaped virtually no financial reward from some of his most
successful songs while others grew rich. Such stories, and there are many in the history of art
and music, are at odds with traditional American notions of fair dealing and profiting from
one's ingenuity.
45 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
46 See Ramos, supra note 9, at 174.
47 See Kwall, How Art Fares, supra note 6, at 3.
48 Article 6bis states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which shall be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
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not unique in this regard-many signatories have not adopted Berne in tote.49
Worldwide, Berne can thus be viewed less as a piece of self-executing
legislation, and more similar to an European Union directive, with signatories
free to adapt it to their national tastes.50
Certainly its ultimate applicability to U.S. law remains to be seen. The
adoption of the Berne Convention by the United States brought with it the first
timid step by the U.S. Congress toward a recognition of moral rights. However,
while Congress has shown some inkling of fortitude, the courts may not be so
adventurous. In the absence of strong Congressional action, the courts are not
going to give Berne any effect The general doctrine of federal preemption and
the "last in time" rule is enough for courts to conclude that VARA delineates the
extent to which 6bis is to be given effect Indeed, Congress explicitly manifested
its desire for this result 51
Rather than viewing the accession to Berne as throwing open the door to
moral rights, it is probably safer to view it as a largely symbolic action. VARA's
de minimis moral right protections are likely, as a practical matter, to be all that
U.S. authors are going to get in this regard for some time.
D. The Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA')
Passage of VARA52 was the first real step by Congress toward any formal
recognition of explicit moral rights. VARA is extremely limited in its scope. It
applies only to "visual art," and provides a limited definition of what constitutes
visual art. A work must consist of two hundred copies or less, signed and
numbered.53 VARA also provides a limited right of integrity in that it gives a
right to prevent destruction of work of "recognized stature."54 VARA excludes
from the definition of visual works: posters, maps, publications, audiovisual
4 9 See World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (last modified Mar. 20,2000), <http'//www.wipo.org/eng/ratifice-
beme.htm>.
50 See Kwall, How Art Fares, supra note 6, at 3; Susan Stanton, Development of the
Berne International Copyright Convention and Implications of United States Adherence, 13
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 149, 149 (1990). European Union directives are not self-executing
legislation. Instead, they must be implemented by national legislation, a process which allows
for differences among national laws. Such differences are tolerated to the extent that they do
not conflict with the goals of the directive, as deternined by the European Court of Justice.
51 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (1990) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C.).
52 See id
5 3 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
54 See § 106A(aX3)(B).
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works, charts, diagrams, databases, etc.55 There is no right of duration,
withdrawal, or droit de suite. Most importantly to this analysis, VARA explicitly
exempts works for hire from any of its protections.5 6
There is another important difference between continental moral rights and
those delineated under VARA. Sections 106 and 113 of the Copyright Act allow
authors to waive their moral rights under the Berne Convention and VARA by
written instrument. Moral rights, as "personality rights," traditionally cannot be
waived.
E. Possible Conflicts Between Moral Rights and the Constitution
1. Transformative Works vs. The Right of Integrity
In addressing the tricky issue of parody, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
"the goal of copyright ... is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works."57 This is true because copyright protection is meant to achieve two
principal aims: To foster innovation and to allow innovators to profit from their
works.58 Yet transformation of a work, at least a substantial transformation, is
violative of the right of integrity.
Transformation of a work by anyone other than the author of a visual work
may violate an author's right of integrity under VARA as well. Thus, as
American copyright law currently stands, there is a fundamental tension between
the broad purposes of copyright law and the right of integrity granted under
VARA, a feature of the Copyright Act. Very few courts have recognized this
tension.59 However, the cases where plaintiffs have tried to enforce their rights of
integrity have most often resulted in the court finding another way to dispose of
the issue.60 It may be coincidence that the cases arising are so often disposed of
without any real treatment on the merits, but one wonders. To the extent that
moral rights conflict with the underpinnings of copyright law, judges and clerks
55 See § 101.
56 See id
57 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569,579 (1994).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569.
59 See supra notes 32,34-35 and accompanying text.
60 See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that because the
work was for hire the issue of VARA protection did not need to be ruled on); Lubner v. City of
Los Angeles, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that simple negligence was not
enough to invoke moral right protection where a car accident destroyed a work of art);
Moakley v. Eastwick, 666 N.E.2d 508 (Mass. 1996) (avoiding having to rule on state moral
right claim by holding that the law did not apply retroactively to works created before its
enactment).
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may be dreading a head-on disposition of the issue.
2. Federal Preemption
An unanswered question is whether federal copyright law, including VARA,
preempts state action concerning moral rights. Despite the recent proliferation of
state moral right statutes, VARA provides that rights under section 106A, moral
rights, are to be exclusively governed by section 106A.61
State moral rights laws include: California (prohibiting the destruction of
"fine art");62 Louisiana (applies to visual works of recognized quality);63 Maine
(applies to visual works regardless of quality); 64 Massachusetts (alteration of a
work is actionable, a "pure" right of integrity); 65 New Jersey (applies to visual
works regardless of quality);66 New Mexico (only applies to art in government
buildings);67 New York (display of altered work is actionable, underlying
alteration is subject to right to prepare derivative works under federal copyright
law);68 Puerto Rico;69 Rhode Island 70 and others.71
Research for this Paper has not yielded a case where a state moral right
statute has been struck down on preemption grounds. In fact, at least one court
found that the federal Copyright Act did not prevent a state moral rights statute
because moral rights were outside the subject matter of the Copyright Act.72
Nonetheless, the possible scenarios for federal preemption in this area are
numerous.
Although Congressional silence is always difficult to interpret, Congress
61 Nonetheless, VARA adds that nothing in its preemption clause "annuls or limits any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to... any cause
of action from undertakings commenced before the effective date" of the federal legislation. 17
U.S.C. § 301(f)(2XA) (1994). At least one court has used this language to allow application of
a state moral right statute. See Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Americas Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620,
627 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
62 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987(c)-989(c) (West Supp. 2000).
63 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2153,2156 (West Supp. 2000).
64 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1996).
65 See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1996).
66 See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-4, -5,-8 (West 1999).
67 SeeN.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to 13-4B-3 (Michie 1997).
68 See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1999-2000).
69 See Act No. 96, July 15, 1988, 31 L.P.R.A. § 1401 (adding Article 359 to the Civil
Code of 1930).
70 See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 5-62-3, -6 (Michie 1994).
71 See Kwall, How Art Fares, supra note 6, at n.166-72; Ramos, supra note 9.
72 See Wojnarowicz v. American Family Assn., 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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spoke with the enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 106A. Courts could rule that by so
doing Congress intended to foreclose state action in the moral rights area.
However, such a ruling could fall victim to the doctrine of unintended
consequences. If the Supreme Court were to adopt such a holding, effectively
striking down a dozen or more state statutes, pressure might finally be put on
Congress to support the passage of meaningful moral rights improvements at the
federal level. It is also possible that the confusion over the appropriate level of
moral right protection will combine with the current federalist trend in both
Congress and the courts to defer to state action (as opposed to federal action, in
contexts ranging from welfare reform to water rights) resulting in the states being
left alone. However, it will be difficult to predict how state moral rights statutes
will fare, at least until other courts have an opportunity to consider
Wojnarowicz.73
Another conceivable basis for federal preemption is the Commerce Clause.
To the extent that the rights of integrity and attribution may be viewed by the
courts as de facto equitable servitudes, and thus restraints on free alienability of
property, they might be seen as interfering with interstate commerce.74
Ironically, while such a determination would probably be made in the context of
striking down a state moral rights statute, it would also greatly bolster one of the
basic propositions of this Paper, that moral rights are economic in nature.
3. Unconstitutional Takings
In the same way that certain moral rights may put constraints on the
alienability of property, giving an author a continuing and unalienable interest in
a piece of property owned by another may amount to an unconstitutional taking.
This is so because the enforcement of, for instance, a right of withdrawal, would
require government action. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear75 held that VARA did not
create an unconstitutional taling because the art installation in question was
temporary. However, this holding hardly puts the question to rest
In theory, this might explain Congressional reluctance to enhance federal
moral rights. There may be concern that increasing restrictions on the alienability
of property may simply open the door for Congress to be handed an unnecessary
defeat from the Supreme Court. After all, why create problems where none
exist? If this is the thinking, it is short-sighted. The need to protect American
authors abroad necessitates improved regularity of law, and militates for
73 See id.
74 See Sheldon W. Halpem, Of Moral Right and Moral Righteousness, I MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REv. 65, 85 (1997) (cautioning that disparities between various state moral right laws
are creating a confusing and unharmonious legal landscape).
75 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
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international enforcement mechanisms (definitely not a favorite of American
lawmakers, and quite possibly also an unconstitutional taking under current
jurisprudence).
HI. WORKS FOR HIRE
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a work for hire as: (a) a work prepared
by an employee in the scope of employment (the common law of agency
determines who falls into this category), or (b) a work which is specially
commissioned as part of a collective work, and there is a signed instrument in
which parties agree that the work is one prepared for hire. 6
The seminal case concerning what constitutes a work for hire is Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 7 In Reid, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth
the rule that doctrines of the law of agency should be employed to determine
who is an "employee" and what constitutes "scope of employment."78 In so
doing, the Court explicitly rejected the use of a "right to control" test.7 9
IV. WORLDS CoLLIDE: THE APPLICATION OF MORAL RIGHTS TO THE
WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE
The following analysis centers on the application of the various moral rights
to works for hire in the context of works prepared by author-employees for mass
production. Professors Hansmann and Santilli have already written an excellent
article on the effects that applying these rights would have on traditional artists.80
Because that analysis has already been done, this Paper examines the economic
consequences of applying moral rights to areas where they have been wholly
excluded in U.S. law.
Full application of the affirmative right of attribution would allow employee-
authors to have their names attached to their work, although their employers
would still legally be considered the authors of the work, and would accordingly
hold the copyrights. This would be likely to have two principal consequences:
First, it would tend to give employee-authors greater recognition in their field,
and greater bargaining power over the terms of their employment If, for
instance, every copy of Windows 98 listed every software designer who played a
substantial role in its creation on its packaging, or on the splash screen, these
76 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
77 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
78 Ij at 739-41.
79 Id. at 741-42.
80 See generally Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 11.
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people would achieve a degree of public notoriety which would otherwise simply
accrue to the Microsoft Corporation. Therein, the right of attribution can be
viewed as an economic right; attribution brings notoriety. This notoriety would
likely then translate into successful employee-authors improving their bargaining
position when negotiating in the future for terms of employment. Accordingly,
the right of attribution improves the author's ability to capitalize on his creations,
an economic benefit.
Second, the knowledge that by succeeding in creation at work an author's
name would attach to the work in perpetuity, would give authors an incentive for
improved job performance. The sense of personal ownership over the work,
which the right of attribution likely would bring, would provide an incentive that
would tend to spur productivity and innovation. Employers would benefit from
this additional motivating factor in terms of increased employee productivity and
effort. Again, the right of attribution would have economic consequences; in this
context, those consequences would include the potential for economic gain to
employers.
Any move by Congress to create an attribution right, which would override
the work for hire doctrine, would undoubtedly meet with howls of outrage from
the private sector. Such a shift in the law would, after all, tend to raise labor
costs. The effects could, in theory, be economically destructive; as labor costs
rise companies are more likely to raise prices, move operations abroad, and
eliminate domestic jobs. Certainly these are the sorts of dire predictions
representatives would be bombarded with while considering such a move.
However, such concerns are likely to be largely unfounded. Although a right
of attribution might result in increased labor costs in the short term, should this
result in a sharp rise in unemployment for professional authors, wage demands
would decrease. Should employers choose to move their operations abroad, they
may not, over time, accomplish their goals; if foreign authors enjoyed a right of
attribution in the United States, they would eventually find themselves in the
same bargaining position with American companies as American authors.
The ultimate effect of allowing a right of attribution to fully attach to works
for hire could be that author-employees might ultimately find themselves holding
greater equity positions in their companies. This is a desirable result A company
whose main products are intellectual property derives its value from the
collective expertise of its employees. To allow those employees to compete for a
greater share of that wealth is simply to allow credit to be given where it is due.
Moreover, increased employee equity-holding is associated with increased
productivity, greater employee loyalty, and improved product quality.81 Saturn
81 Research by those who are in favor of this particular business philosophy suggests that
offering workers a piece of the rock increases their loyalty, improves their work effort and
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and American Airlines provide examples of companies that have achieved
economic success in extremely competitive industries by allowing increased
employee ownership of the company.
Allowing free alienability of the right of attribution in the work for hire
context would probably tend to bring more negative results.82 If employee-
authors are able to dispose of their right of attribution, such a disposal would
likely become part of every boilerplate employment contract, and would quickly
render the right meaningless. In the alternative, it might simply raise labor costs
as companies pay to buy out these rights, without increasing employee equity
ownership. The reason why this would be so is that the buyout would be a one-
time cost This scenario could definitely result in increased labor costs and
subsequently higher prices. By making the right of attribution inalienable, as a
true moral right, the end result could be a gradual (and, in all likelihood,
relatively small) increase in employee ownership of companies producing
intellectual products. By only going halfway, and providing for a freely alienable
right of attribution in the context of works for hire, the possible economic
consequences seem not only less desirable, but undesirable.
There is little, if any, support for this view among commentators. Professors
Hansmann and Santilli argue that the right of attribution need not apply to works
for hire because works for hire are subject to a great degree of control by
employers-commissioners, and as such are not "art.''83 In the alternative,
Hansmann and Santilli argue that when an employee-author prepares a work for
hire he is waiving his moral rights by waiving his ability to assert full creative
control over the work.84 This approach makes sense if moral rights are viewed in
their classical context: protection for creators of fine art. However, because the
law of copyright governs all manner of nonartistic creation,85 it is not illogical to
aligns their interests with those of the company. Moreover, there appears to be a strong
correlation between employee "ownership" and corporate profitability. See Scott Hayes,
Ownership Cultures' Create Unity: Employee Stock-Ownership Plans Can Help Grow the
Company's Top Line by Inspiring Workers to Think and Act Like Owners, WORKFORCE, Feb.
1999, at 60.
82 Although this analysis bears some resemblance to the analysis of the economic
interests attached to the right of integrity advanced by Professors Hansmann and Santilli, the
similarity was not intended. The foregoing economic analysis was based solely on the author's
own interpretations of possible economic consequences. Any mistakes or logical errors are the
author's own, and this section should not be read as a mangled rewrite.
83 See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 11, at 134. In arguing for the general proposition
that moral rights are pecuniary rights, these commentators generally rely on the context of
protecting the economic rights of "artists," as opposed to creators of fungible products.
84 See id.
85 See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (allowing
copyright protection for video "pong"). While creation of the game in question certainly
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extend moral right to nonartistic works of original authorship, especially where
there is an economic justification.86 The U.S. Supreme Court has, after all,
articulated that the underlying goals of copyright law are economic.87 Perhaps
then, the most sensible approach for proponents of moral rights is to frame them
as economic rights, and make economic arguments in their defense. In addition,
Hansmann's and Santilli's position that employee-authors do not produce "art,"
in the same sense as independent artists is oversimplistic and misguided. First it
is not always true. Some employee-authors do have total control over their
works. Second, even where they do not, the ability of the employer to guide the
shape of the work would only render the employer a joint author under section
101 of the Copyright Act, but for the employment relationship. Thus, in a
situation where all else was equal, except for the employment relationship, the
law of copyright already acknowledges that the author whose work is guided by
another remains an author. Whether it is proper for the fact of the employment
relationship to vest title to the copyright in the work to the employer is a subject
left for another day, but where the law would recognize authorship but for the
employment relationship, its existence should not be enough to totally divest the
author of all rights in the work. The employee-author should have a continuing
right to have her name attached to the work; the right of attribution should be
merged with the work for hire doctrine.
By contrast full application of the right of integrity to works for hire is
problematic. If employee-authors have the final say over the form of a product,
quality control and uniformity within an industry become virtually impossible.
For instance, should a designer of Windows 98 have the final word on the shape
the product will take, she could be motivated by concerns which are
noneconomic; for instance, an artistically motivated choice of form over
function. Such a state of affairs does not serve broad economic interests.
Therefore, it is appropriate that employers and commissioners maintain broad
discretion to specify characteristics of a work in advance, and to alter the work as
needed to achieve economic goals (i.e. marketability, compatibility with other
products, safety, etc.).
Again, Professors Hansmann and Santilli take the opposite view, arguing for
full application of the right of integrity.88 Their argument is entirely cogent
required creativity, it was not art in the classical sense.
86 Another criticism of the Hansmann-Santilli approach is the invariable difficulty in
determining what constitutes "art.' In their article, Hansmann and Santilli try to address this
question, only to fall back to an economic analysis. See Hansniann & Santilli, supra note 11, at
108. It may be easier, because of the difficulty in pinning dovm "are' to simply abandon trying
and proceed with an economic analysis of the problem from the outset.
87 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954).
8 8 See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 11, at 104.
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because they write in the context of the classical model of an artist. In that
context there is a compelling argument for the right of integrity; indeed, an
artist's pecuniary interests are inextricably linked to the survival, intact of his
previous work. However, context is everything. In the case of an author
preparing works in the scope of his employment, one has to assume that the
author is performing an economic role that has ramifications well beyond his
own pecuniary interests. These economic considerations must be taken into
account in analyzing the propriety of making sweeping changes in employee-
authors' legal rights.
In this context, the argument Hansmann and Santilli advance, pertaining to
the right of attribution, is much stronger. Where the employer asserts great
control over the shape of the work, the author could be said to waive a right of
integrity. It is still the author who creates the work, and so she should be entitled
to be recognized as such. But given what may be a lack of real creative input
employee-authors should have less right to preserve its form.
The analysis is essentially the same for the right of disclosure. Because the
right of disclosure is bound up with issues of creative control, entering a situation
where creative control has been waived (as in a work for hire setting) reasonably
constitutes a waiver of the right of disclosure. While the potential cost to
employers of allowing authors to be recognized as such could be significant the
cost of allowing authors to delay production indefinitely could be disastrous.
Allowing a right of withdrawal could, at first blush, appear to have serious
economic consequences. However, as Hansmann, Santilli, and this Paper
illustrate, it may be largely meaningless.89 Again, keep in mind that this analysis
is conducted in a different context while Hansmann and Santilli were primarily
concerned with artists, this Paper is primarily concerned with author-employees.
The point is well taken that a right of withdrawal does not mean much when the
artist will have to buy back the work anyway.90 This is only more starkly true
when the cost of buying back, for instance, Windows 98, is well beyond the
means of almost any individual. Therefore, there is little point in applying this
right generally to U.S. law. In the work for hire context it would, as a practical
matter, be an empty gesture; there really is no point in creating a ' right" that
hardly anyone can afford to exercise.
Application of the droit de suite to works for hire presents a number of
advantages to employee-authors, but a number of troubling economic concerns
as well. There can be no question that the droit de suite is an economic right.
Policy arguments could be made that similar to the analysis of the right of
integrity above, application of the droit de suite would tend to economically
89 See id at 139.
90 See iL
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empower employee-authors and shift the balance of power away from
employers. Certainly there are uncountable cases of employee-authors who have
watched their creations make others rich. However, practical considerations
militate against all but the most limited application of this doctrine in the work
for hire setting.91 An inevitable explosion of litigation would result, creating
costs where none now exist. As a practical matter it would simply be impossible
to account for all resale profits of mass produced items. Furthermore, the first
sale doctrine is squarely at odds with the droit de suite. It may be desirable,
however, to give some limited right of droit de suite in the case of fine art works
for hire, so as to allow authors to benefit from resale of their works should the
works appreciate greatly after their creation.
V. CONCLUSION
These arguments are made with an awareness of Professor Halpem's caution
that "moral right is culturally dependent," and "may be parochial rather than
universal legal principles."9 2 However, by proposing a normative rather than a
descriptive model, this Paper makes the point that regardless of the origins of
moral right principles, they have economic consequences which may strengthen
the case for their emergence as universal principles. Despite the currently
unsettled definition of these rights, there is a case for the limited development of
moral right as bedrock doctrine. After all, capitalism and democracy began as
culturally specific ideas as well.
If one is willing to look beyond the traditional view of moral rights, that they
apply exclusively to "artists," (with a capital "A"), there is economic utility in
allowing a right of attribution to supersede the work for hire doctrine. However,
there are strong economic disincentives to extend other forms of moral right to
works for hire, so long as the discussion remains focused on works that are
produced by employee-authors for mass production.
Allowing employee-authors to receive notoriety for their creations would
tend to create a situation where these authors have an improved ability to
capitalize on their own talent In addition, pride of ownership and the sense of
enfianchisement that would accompany the right to have one's name
permanently attached to one's work, regardless of the context in which that work
was created, would tend to provide incentive for increased productivity,
creativity, and efficiency. Integration of the moral right of attribution into the
works for hire doctrine is thus an economically desirable goal. The remaining
91 See Halpem, supra note 74, at 85 (calling the extension of droit de suite "an invitation
to legal-aesthetic chaos").
92 Id
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moral rights, while perhaps meritorious, would tend to have negative economic
consequences if combined with the works for hire doctrine, and thus they should
not be.

